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Der Gegenangriff vor Verrières 
German Counterattacks during Operation 
"Spring": 25-26 July 1944 
Roman Johann Jarymowycz 
In the area of Panzer Group West the enemy attempted 
on the 25th and 26th July with 2 Canadian InfDiv 
and 1 Armoured Brigade to penetrate between 
Bourquebus and the Orne on a 7 km wide front. After 
hard fighting and counterattacks, 1 st SS Panzer 
Korps gained a complete defensive victory. 
Field Marshal von Kluge, 31 July 1944 
The Canadian effort in Operation "Spring" has been well-documented by Canadian 
military historians. July 25th is perhaps the 
most investigated Canadian operation fought 
during World War II.1 The German defense of 
Verrieres Ridge was determined— Lieutenant-
General G.G. Simonds' infantry paid dearly for 
each yard won. The enemy did not limit itself 
to positional defense and blocking tactics. In 
the break-in battle, or kesselschlacht, German 
doctrine called for counterat tacks to be 
delivered as quickly as possible: 
. . . surprise can overcome the enemy, without the 
enemy artillery or air forces having a chance to 
intervene. . .It is, therefore, essential to maintain 
reserves in at least every battalion sector, which 
come forward immediately after the barrage has 
ended before the British artillery can register— 
unsupported infantry will break.2 
1 SS Panzer Korps delivered counterattacks 
at two levels: divisional reserve counterstrokes 
(by dedicated kampfgruppes3) and the corps 
operational reserve counterattack by the 9th 
SS "Hohenstaufen" Panzer Division. Severely 
reduced by the heavy fighting throughout June 
Opposite: Soldiers silhouetted against gunfire in the 
early morning of 25 July 1944 near Fleury-sur-Ome. 
(Photo by Michael M. Dean, NAC PA 131384) 
and Operations "Charnwood," "Atlantic" and 
"Goodwood," the German formations facing II 
Canadian Corps continued to create strong 
panzer reserves, but they were seldom the 
equivalent of a weak Canadian brigade group 
and more often comprised a strongly reinforced 
battalion. 
"Spring": Canadian Plans 
L ieutenant-General Simonds planned "Spring" as a three-phase operation. The 
first phase required the capture of the line 
Tilly-la-Campagne—Verrieres—May-sur-Orne. 
Phase 2 was the capture of line Fontenay-le-
Marmion—Rocquancourt. On successful 
completion of Phase 2, ideally at first light, 
Simonds would order his armour to push 
forward and capture the high ground beyond 
Verrieres—"The Cramesn i l Spur" and 
Cintheaux. With a little luck, a German collapse 
and some determined leadership by the 
reconnaissance regiments, British armoured 
cars could possibly reach the Laison River, if 
not Falaise itself, by nightfall. 
There was later discussion regarding 
Simonds' operational aims. Senior Canadian 
officers considered "Spring" a breakout attempt, 
but Simonds insisted after the war it was a 
"holding attack"4 designed to draw German 
panzer divisions away from Operation "Cobra" 
— General Omar Bradley's attack at St. Lo. 
The U.S. breakout was also scheduled for 25 
July and was supported by what became the de 
rigueur opening act for major Allied offensives 
in Normandy: massive air bombardment by 
heavy bombers. 
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Guy Simonds' resources were Major-
General R.F.L. Keller's veteran 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division and Major-General C. Foulkes' 
relatively green 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. 
For armour Simonds had three powerful 
formations: the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade (2 CAB), the 7th British Armoured 
Division (the "Desert Rats") and the Guards 
Armoured Division.5 Simonds was particularly 
well supported by indirect fire: the artillery of 
the four Canadian and British divisions, as 
well as three Army Groups Royal Artillery 
(AGRA), for a total of twelve field, nine medium 
and three heavy regiments.6 
Simonds chose to distribute 2 CAB's 
regiments among the 2nd and 3rd Infantry 
Divisions. Foulkes and Keller further broke up 
their armour and allotted a squadron per 
attacking brigade. The brigadiers assigned 
their squadrons to the two battalions tasked 
with a Phase 2 objective—planned to be 
captured at "First Tank Light." As 2 CAB was 
distributed throughout the Corps, 7th British 
Armoured moved to Ifs and its armoured 
component, 22nd Armoured Brigade eventually 
concentrated in the area of Beauvoir Farm. 
The Guards Armoured Division was moved 
into the southern suburbs of Caen, just north 
of Ifs ready for the Phase 3 exploitation. It was 
never to be used. 
76 
The Other Side of the Ridge 
German defence doctrine adhered to the three level principle forged during the 
waning years of the First World War: a thinly 
held forward zone, a center main defence area 
and a rear area comprised of reserves ready to 
block or counterattack.7 Verrieres Ridge was 
held by two German Divisions: General 
Schack's 272nd Grenadier and SS Generaimqjor 
Theodor Wisch's 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf 
Hitler Panzer Division (1st SS LAH). 
The 272nd was one of the three "270" series 
raised in late-1943 and sent to France to train. 
It was composed of veterans and a varied mix 
of Germans and Osten Truppen (Russians and 
Poles). The division had spent the last six 
months training in the Perpignan area. In its 
first battle—Operation "Atlantic," 18-23 July,8 
the 272nd had been roughly handled by the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division but still 
deployed three weak grenadier regiments, the 
Fusilier Battalion and its Panzer Jaeger 
Battalion (towed 75 mm Pak and Marder self-
propelled anti-tank guns). Its artillery was 
mostly intact.9 
Jagdpanzer V - Jagdpanther 
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The 1 st SS LAH was simply the best German 
panzer division in the Third Reich. Its units' 
battle honours included the campaigns in 
Poland '39, France '40, and Greece '41. It had 
fought as a complete division in Russia in 
1942-43 and was rebuilding in Belgium when 
the Allied invasion of Normandy began. The 
LAH had its normal panzer regiment (two 
battalions of main battle tanks: one with 
Panthers; the second equipped with Mark IVs) 
and two infantry regiments (six battalions of 
which one was mounted on half-track armoured 
personnel carriers). For infantry support the 
division had a Sturmgeschutz battalion (Stug 
III). To kill armour the LAH had its Panzerjdeger 
battalion augmented with a company of the 
deadly JagdPanzer TVTank destroyers.10 
Both German divisions were supported by 
the artillery of 1st SS Panzer Korps, recently 
reinforced by 8th Werfer Brigade. LAH was 
also reinforced by the 272nd's Fusilier Battalion 
and 101 SS schwer Panzer abteilung (sch Pz 
Abt)—an independent Tiger battalion. The 
272nd was augmented by three units under 
command: the reconnaissance battalion of 
10th SS Panzer Division, an infantry battalion 
from 9th SS Panzer Division and an armour-
heavy kampfgruppe from 2nd Panzer Division 
which served as the divisional reserve/ 
77 
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counterattack force. If this was not formidable 
enough, 503 schPzAbt (Tiger I and King Tiger 
lib) was also under command.11 
The left flank was protected by 10th SS 
Panzer Division and 102nd SS schPzAbt (Tiger 
I) firing from the high ground west of the Orne. 
In depth, the operational reserve for 1st SS 
Panzer Korps was 9th SS Panzer Division which 
had two kampfgruppes available south of 
Verrieres directly behind 272nd and 1st SS. 
Also available, but under OKW control was the 
recently arrived 116th Panzer Division, building 
up east of Cramesnil as well as the remainder 
of 2nd Panzer Division, south of May astride 
the Orne.12 
THE GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS 
There were three separate counterattacks during Operation "Spring." Each was 
conducted by at least a reserve battlegroup 
from one of three panzer divisions: 1st SS LAH; 
9th SS Hohenstaujen and 2nd Weiner Panzer.13 
It would be difficult to suggest which was the 
most effective. Kampfgruppes from LAH and 
2nd Panzer savaged the North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders (NNS) and destroyed the Black 
Watch. The initial 9th SS attack failed to break 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Rockingham's Royal 
Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) or recapture 
Verrieres but its left hook totally defeated 
Brigadier W.J. Megill's 5th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, recaptured May-sur-Orne, St. Martin, 
and the approaches to Hill 67.14 
The German army conducted a battle of 
manoeuver. It fought and won under extremely 
adverse conditions: total Allied air and artillery 
supremacy. It was less Canadian incompetence 
than German skill and experience that gave 
Kluge ". . .a complete defensive victory."15 
Counterattacks by 1st SS Panzer Division: 
Der Kampf am Tilly 
The LAH held three of the four key positions on Verrieres: the stone villages of Tilly-la-
Campagne, Verrieres and Rocquancourt. Each 
was defended by a reinforced company group 
supported by tanks or assault guns.16 Three 
Canadian battalion attacks were launched 
against these objectives: Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. Petch's North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
attacked Tilly and were stopped dead. The 
presence of the 1st SS appears to have been a 
complete surprise, particularly the tanks dug 
into the village perimeter. 
Petch pleaded with the commander of 9th 
Brigade to reinforce him. Brigadier D.G. 
Cunningham ordered "B" Squadron from the 
Fort Garry Horse (10th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment), scheduled to advance with the 
Highland Light Infantry during Phase 2, to 
move forward and help the Novies.17 The 
Canadian Shermans boldly moved forward but 
suddenly found themselves in a killing zone. 
SS Untersturmfuhrer Gehrard Stiller's 7th 
Panzer Company destroyed most of "B" 
Squadron in a matter of minutes.18 
Control of Tilly-la-Campagne meant that 
the 1 st SS could dominate the Caen—Falaise 
highway as well as shoot directly into the flank 
and rear of British or Canadian squadrons 
trying to maneuver past Verrieres. When the 
Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) attempted to 
advance on Rocquancourt, 1st SS Panzer 
Regiment sprung its trap. Using Rocquancourt 
as the anvil, Panthers and Tigers flanked the 
RRC axis of advance and hammered the 
supporting 1st Hussar Squadron and the 
exposed infantry.19 This was more properly, a 
counterattack by fire. 
Further German counterattacks in Tilly 
were limited to reinforcing platoons that 
attacked and recaptured individual buildings 
or walled gardens held by the Novies. Petch's 
command, exposed, neither in nor out of the 
village, and too close for safe artillery support, 
remained locked in close quarter combat until 
night. 
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1st SS Counterattacks: Rocky at Verrieres 
T he RHLI, skillfully commanded by Rockingham, secured its own start line 
and quickly captured Verrieres. The village 
was the strategic center of the ridge and the 1st 
SS reacted promptly and violently:20 
Counterattacks began Immediately, causing further 
casualties to troops and equipment. Four of our six 
pounder anti-tank guns were destroyed by direct fire 
from enemy tanks. At one period, three enemy tanks 
were In a forward company area before one was 
knocked out with a PIAT and the others withdrew.21 
The Rileys were effectively supported by a 
troop of 17-pounders Rockingham deployed 
forward of Troteval Farm and by the British 
22nd Armoured Brigade. Ordered by Simonds 
to help the RHLI, the British sequentially 
allotted individual squadrons from the 4th 
County of London Yeomanry (CLY) and the 1st 
Royal Tank Regiment (RTR)22 to operate on the 
western flank of Verrieres village and hull 
down at the crest line of the ridge itself. The 
RHLI held firm. 
The Counterattack by 272nd Division: 
Kampfgruppe Sterz 
G eneral Schack deployed the 272nd Division two regiments up with his depth 
regiment holding a reverse slope position 
centered on the village of Fontenay-le-
Marmion,23 the Black Watch objective in 
"Spring."24 Below the ridge, and out of direct 
79 
Operation "Spring": Counterattacks, 25 July 1944 - 1000 to 2000 hours 
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Preceeding pages: 
Left: This aerial photograph, taken on 7 August 
1944, shows the village qfVerrieres. The RHLI 
staged a successful defence qfVerrieres against 
determined German counterattacks. Just visible at 
the top of the photo is the Troteval Farm. 
Right: Tilly-la-Campagne is visible at the bottom 
left of the photo. At the top is Bourgebus. 
(LCMSDS) 
observation to Canad ian gunne r s , were the 
self-propelled an t i - t ank g u n s a n d Tigers of 
503rd sch Pz Abt. The division's reserve and 
coun te ra t t ack force w a s Kampfgruppe Sterz, 
seconded from 2nd Panzer Division. 
Major S t e r z w a s t h e c o m m a n d e r o f 
Panzerjdger Abteilung 38 , t he 2nd Panzer 
Division's ant i - tank battalion. His kampfgruppe 
consisted of the 3rd Panzer Regiment 's leichter 
zug (light t roop — actually, 4 Mk rVs), a Pan the r 
c o m p a n y , h i s own J a g d P a n z e r I V t a n k 
destroyers a n d a bat ta l ion of panzer grenadiers 
m o u n t e d in Sd.Kfz 2 5 1 / I s (armoured half-
tracks) . Sterz 's miss ion w a s to coun te ra t t ack 
w i t h i n S c h a c k ' s d i v i s i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , 
specifically to r e s to r e a n y s i t u a t i o n t h a t 
th rea tened 272nd control of May-sur-Orne 
a n d Verrieres Ridge.25 
Sterz posi t ioned h i s light t roop u n d e r 
OberleutnantP. Prien directly in May-sur-Orne 
a s h i s own v a n g u a r d a n d h a r b o u r e d t h e 
remainder of the kampfgruppe in Laize-la-Ville, 
approximately 2 .5 km or 15 m i n u t e s t ank 
driving t ime away. Although their warn ing 
order c a m e a s early a s 0 5 3 0 h o u r s , t h e 
counte ra t t ack was not l aunched unt i l a round 
0945 h o u r s after Prien reported contact with 
Canadian a rmour ("B" squadron, First Hussars , 
commanded by Captain J.W. Powell) and a 
bat ta l ion of infantry (the Black Watch, unde r 
Major Phil Griffin),26 advancing towards May. 
Sterz reached his s t a r t line sou th of May-
sur -Orne a t approximately 1000 h o u r s and 
divided his command into three a s sau l t groups: 
the Panthers left; the panzer grenadier battal ion 
center and the JagdPanzers on the right.27 
Suppor ted by 272nd divisional artillery and 
flanking fire from the 10th SS sector across the 
Orne, Sterz overran and destroyed the Black 
Watch.2 8 
Sterz cont inued by at tacking the 1 st H u s s a r 
S h e r m a n s a n d r e m n a n t s of "B" Company, 
Calgary Highlanders who were still a t tempt ing 
to h a n g on to the no r the rn section of May. Both 
sub -un i t s were driven back. The 2nd Panzer 
A German Nebel-
werfer s ix-bar-
relled rocket pro-
jector . Allied 
troops called it 
"Moaning Minnie" 
because of the 
sound of its pro-
jectiles. 
(CFPU PMR 83-757) 
82 
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attack continued until it reached "The Factory" 
area29 south of St. Martin, where it lost 
momentum in the face of a determined stand 
by the surviving platoons of the Calgaries and 
Support Company, Black Watch. Bombarded 
by heavy artillery stonks, Sterz disengaged at 
about 1330 hours. He had stopped 5th Brigade, 
cleared May and forced the Canadians to 
withdraw; however St. Martin, as well as parts 
of "The Factory" were still reported in Canadian 
hands.30 
The Operational Reserve is released: 
The 9th SS Hohenstaufen 
The Germans quickly appreciated "Spring" was a major effort by II Canadian Corps. 
By mid-morning its apparent success created 
serious worry for 1 SS Panzer Korps. Initial 
reports indicated that the Canadians had 
broken through the HauptKampfLinie (HKL, 
the Forward Edge of the Battle Area) and were 
on Verrieres Ridge in strength. Serious fighting 
was confirmed in Tilly-la-Campagne, Verrieres 
and May-sur-Orne. More alarming, British 
armour was observed massing for a further 
assault.31 
Field Marshal Hans Kluge, commander of 
German forces in Normandy, visited the I SS 
Panzer Korps that morning and was fully briefed 
on the Verrieres situation. He quickly gave 
permission to release the operational reserve 
and launch the corps counterattack.32 The 
complete order, from Chief of Staff I SS Korps, 
Oberfuhrer Kramer to Oberstrumbannfuhrer 
Harzer took less than one minute.33 The 9th SS 
ins t ruct ions were to "attack nor th and 
reestablish the original HKL."34 
The Counterattacks by 9th SS: 
Kampfgruppes Meyer and Zollhofer 
H ohenstaufen fielded two battlegroups. The armour-heavy kampfgruppe, commanded 
by Oberstrumannfuhrer Otto Meyer (no relation 
to Kurt Meyer of 12th SS Hitler Jugend), was 
composed of Panthers and Mk IVs of 9th SS 
Panzer Regiment, a panzer grenadier battalion, 
a company of engineers and a flak battery. The 
infantry-heavy kampfgruppe (the Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment "Hohenstaufen," a 
Sturmgeshutz company, and supported by the 
bulk of 9th SS Divisional artillery) was 
83 
Captured German armour: Sd.Kfz 251/9 halftrack with 7.5 cm gun (left) and a Stug III. 
(Photo by G.K. Bell, NAC PA 114156) 
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Opposing Forces: 
First Canadian 
Army Front, 
8 August 1944 
c o m m a n d e d by Oberstrumannfuhrer 
Zollhofer.35 Meyer was ordered to advance 
"east of Fontenay towards point 88" roughly 
the geographic center of Verrieres Ridge. 
Zollhofer was tasked to advance "west of 
Fontenay towards St. Martin."36 Both attacks 
were launched around 1600 hours. 
"Wer die Hohe uberschreitet 
ist ein toter Mann!" 
Although the 25th was occasionally over-cast, the skies above Verrieres were full of 
Allied tank-killing aircraft. Given Simonds' 
strength in artillery and total domination of the 
sky,37 Meyer's ability to advance from Bretteville 
84 
to his start line (north-east of Fontenay) was 
remarkable. Canadian and British observers 
reported the German advance38 and Simonds, 
or the Commander of 4th Brigade, it is not clear 
who, quickly organized a reverse slope defence. 
It included elements of 22nd British Armoured 
Brigade, 4th Infantry Brigade, 1st Hussars, 
and 23rd Canadian Armoured Regiment. 
As Meyer's panzers crossed the crest they 
ran into a well-orchestrated crossfire of 17-
pounder and 6-pounder ant i- tank guns, 
Shermans and supporting artillery. Canadian 
fire was so deadly that Meyer reported at 1750 
hours: "Whoever crosses this ridge is a dead 
man!" Undaunted, he swung west to support 
Zollhofer's attack39 against 5th Brigade. 
11
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This air photo shows St. Martin-de-Fontenay at the top and "The Factory" area just below it. At the bottom of 
the photo is May-sw-Orne. 
(LCMSDS) 
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"Wo ist Zollhofer?" 
The 9th SS left hook was late getting off the mark. The Hohenstaufen had considerable 
trouble crossing the crest near May and 
launching its attack. General Schack's HQ 
demanded "Where is Zollhofer?" By 1840 
hours the Hohenstaufen kampfgruppe had the 
joined battle and had begun to clear St. Martin. 
One reason for Zollhofer's delay was that he 
had run into a Canadian counterattack ordered 
by Simonds.40 
Le Regiment de Maisonneuve was returned 
to Brigadier Megill's command and directed to 
capture May. The battalion attack began 
promisingly enough but soon ran into heavy 
flanking fire from 272nd defenders still in St. 
Andreas well as 10th SS and 102nd SS Tiger 
fire from across the Orne. J u s t as the 
Montrealers were making progress, they, like 
the Black Watch earlier, ran into a German 
counterattack: Zollhofer. The Maisies were 
forced back to their start line. They were to 
remain there until 8 August. 
Once the Maisonneuves had withdrawn, 
Zollhofer continued his attack through "The 
Factory" and into St. Martin. The 9th SS 
history credits Zollhofer with reaching the high 
ground north of St. Andre. There is some 
argument as to the extent of the German 
victory. However, Black Watch and Calgary 
war diaries confirm that the two battalions 
withdrew to Basse and Fleury-sur-Orne, north 
of Hill 67, and out of view of St. Martin and St. 
Andre.41 Clearly, St. Martin and "the Factory" 
were recaptured and only the original foothold 
in St. Andre remained in Canadian hands. 
Tiger tank pointing to Bourgebus. 
(Photo taken in August 1946 by G. Noble, PMR 82-064) 
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Once 9th SS had reestablished the HKL, 
major German counterattacks against Verrieres 
Ridge ended.42 
"Spring": The Final Results 
The German tally sheet for "Spring" shows the following: Tilly was held and would 
remain in German hands until 8 August.43 The 
1st SS had lost Verrieres village to the Rileys. 
Despite the best efforts of two experienced 
German panzer divisions, the Canadians hung 
on to the center of the ridge. The 5th Brigade 
front was a shambles. The 2nd Panzer 
recaptured May; 9th SS recaptured St. Martin 
and, according to the Hohenstaufen history, 
reached Hill 67.44 The Calgaries, Camerons 
and Black Watch were forced back leaving only 
the Regiment de Maisonneuve clinging to St. 
Andre, which they never quite controlled: "Le 
28 juillet le Batalion recevait l'ordre de nettoyer 
completement le village de Saint-Andre. La 
compagnie a reussi a s'approcher de Feglise, 
toujours infestee d'Allemands."45 
For the Germans, the battle for Verrieres 
was a doctrinal success. They had given II 
Canadian Corps a bloody setback. "Heirbei 
hatte der Feind hohe blutige Verluste. "46 Quick 
counterattacks succeeded except in the one 
area where Simonds ordered 22nd Armoured 
to support Rockingham. If "Spring" was indeed 
planned as a "holding attack" it appears to 
have failed. Before 25 July there were seven 
panzer divisions and three heavy tank 
battalions47 deployed within the II Corps zone 
of operational influence. After "Spring" there 
was only one: 12th SS Hitler Jugend supported 
by one weak Tiger company.48 
Attack is fire that advances, Defense is fire that 
counterattacks. 
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